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NOTES 
Contract Rights and the Successor Employer: 
The Impact of Burns Security* 
The extent to which a new employer is obligated to a union 
that has established a bargaining relationship with a previous em-
ployer has troubled both the National Labor Relations Board and 
the courts. In this context, several interests central to national labor 
relations policy-freedom of contract, flexibility in the transfer of 
business assets, employee job security, and industrial stability-
collide, and a satisfactory general solution has not yet been reached. 
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.1 the Su-
preme Court recently confronted this question in a factual setting 
quite unlike the usual successorship case.2 While the Court, per 
Justice White, carefully noted that the decision turned largely on 
the "precise facts involved,"3 its opinion appears to establish the 
following proposition of general application in NLRB proceedings: 
The Board in certain circumstances can require a new employer to 
recognize and bargain with the union that had established a 
collective-bargaining relationship with its predecessor employer, but 
the Board cannot compel it to honor the substantive terms of the 
agreement that had been negotiated by the predecessor employer 
and the union. In contrast, if not conflict, eight years earlier the 
Supreme Court held, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston4 
that in appropriate circumstances a successor employer-in that 
case the employer surviving a corporate merger-could be com-
pelled by the courts, in an action brought under section 301 of the 
Labor-Management Relations Act,15 to arbitrate the extent to which 
the successor was bound under the collective-bargaining agreement 
that was negotiated by the union with the predecessor employer. 
This Note will only briefly discuss the implications of Burns 
for NLRB proceedings. Instead, the focus will be on the impact 
of Burns on actions to compel arbitration under section 30 I. Is the 
rationale of Burns inconsistent with the rule established in Wiley 
• NLRB v. llurns Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), afjg. 441 F.2d 911 
(1971), enfordng in part 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970). 
1. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
2. For other discussions of the case, see St, Antoine, Judicial Caution and the 
Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH, J. L. REF. 269, 270-77 
(1973); Recent Decision, 41 GEO. WASH, L. REv, 106 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 50, 247-59 (1972); Note, Labor Law-The Obligations of a 
Successor Employer, 51 N.C. L. REv. 337 (1972); Recent Development, 18 VILL. L. REv. 
126 (1972). 
8. 406 U.S. at 274. 
4. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
5. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1970). 
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for section 301 actions? If it does not undermine Wiley, does Burns 
indicate when employers will be deemed successors in future actions 
under section 301 to compel arbitration? Before examining these 
questions, however, it is necessary to consider the decisions of Wiley 
and Burns. 
In Wiley a union sought to compel arbitration concerning the 
effect of a merger on certain contract rights6 of the predecessor's 
employees who were retained by the successor. Stressing the strong 
"'federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration,' "7 Justice 
Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court,8 affirmed the order com-
pelling arbitration: 
The objectives of national labor policy ... require that the rightful 
prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses 
and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some 
protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employ-
ment relationship. The transition from one corporate organization 
to another will in most cases be eased and industrial strife avoided 
if employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitration . . . . 
The preference of national labor policy for arbitration . . . 
could be overcome only if other considerations compellingly so 
demanded. We find none. While the principles of law governing 
ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting 
successor to a contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement 
is not an ordinary contract. " .•. [I]t is a generalized code to govern 
a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate." 
•.. [I]t is not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual 
relationship.9 
The Court noted that the survival of the duty to arbitrate is ap-
propriate only where there is "substantial continuity of identity 
in the business enterprise before and after a change."10 The "whole-
sale transfer" of employees from Interscience, Wiley's predecessor, 
to Wiley indicated sufficient continuity, despite the fact that Wiley 
was a much larger publisher than Interscience.11 
In subsequent section 30 I actions, Wiley was extended beyond 
merger situations to purchases of businesses,12 transfers of operations 
6. The disputes involved contract provisions that covered seniority, welfare security 
benefits, discharge and lay-offs, severance pay, and vacations. 376 U.S. at 554 n.7. 
7. 376 U.S. at 549, quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
8. Justice Goldberg took no part in the decision of the case. 
9. 376 U.S. at 549-50 (emphasis added), quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
10. 376 U.S. at 551. 
11. 376 U.S. at 551. 
12. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 3!15 
F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 
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from a recently terminated subsidiary to a newly acquired sub-
sidiary,13 and judicial sales.14 At the same time, the NLRB was 
holding certain employers, which it found to be "successors," to a 
duty to bargain with the predecessors' union.15 Six years after 
Wiley, in William ]. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.16 
the NLRB held for the first time that these employers were also 
required, under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA),17 to honor the substantive terms of the contract negotiated 
by their predecessors. 
On April 29, 1967, Wackenhut Corporation, which at that time 
provided plant protection services for the Lockheed Aircraft Service 
Co., signed a three-year contract with the United Plant Guard 
Workers of America (UPG).18 Several months later, the following 
year's service contract was awarded to Burns, which had been given 
notice of the union's status at the plant before submitting its bid.19 
Although Burns hired forty-two guards, twenty-seven of whom had 
worked for Wackenhut and :fifteen of whom had been brought in 
from other Burns job sites, it refused the UPG's demand that the 
UPG be recognized as the bargaining representative of the Lockheed 
guards and that Burns abide by the existing contract.20 Instead, 
Burns presented the twenty-seven employees with the cards of the 
American Federation of Guards (AFG), with which it had several 
existing contracts, and told them that membership in AFG was a 
prerequisite to employment.21 
The Board found that Burns had committed unfair labor prac-
tices by its refusals to recognize and bargain with the union and to 
954 (9th Cir. 1964); Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees v. Joden, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 
390 (D. Mass. 1966). See also McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352, 353 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966) (dictum that there may be sufficient continuity 
where only part of a business is purchased). 
13. Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
831 (1967). 
14. In re Liquidation Holding Corp., 68 L.R.R.M. 2551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). 
15. E.g., Overnite Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965); 
Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964); South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 
1448 (1944), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 
1945). 
16. 182 N.LR.B. 348 (1970). The respondent's name was changed from William 
J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., to Burns International Security Services, 
Inc., in the period between the decisions of the court of appeals, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 
1971), and the Supreme Court. 
17. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to 
bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees. Section 8(d) further 
defines the nature of this duty to bargain. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d) (1970). 
18. 406 U.S. at 275. 
19. 406 U.S. at 275. 
20. 406 U.S. at 275-76. 
21. 406 U.S. at 275. 
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honor the previously negotiated contract,22 as well as by its assistance 
and recognition of AFG.28 Specifically, the Board found that, "absent 
unusual circumstances," section 8(a)(5) required that a successor 
honor the previously negotiated contract,24 a decision expressly 
based on the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Wiley.25 
Board Member Jenkins dissented, arguing that Wiley's emphasis on 
"arbitration and its inherent flexibility and adjustment to unfore-
seen circumstances," indicated that the agreement should not be 
imposed in toto by the Board.26 
The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the Second Cir-
cuit,27 unanimously refused to enforce the Board's order insofar as 
it required Burns to honor the agreement.28 However, the Board's 
finding of a duty to bargain was upheld by a vote of five to four.29 
In addressing the question of Burns' duty to bargain with the 
union, the Court stressed several factors. First, it was noted that the 
trial examiner had found that the appropriate bargaining unit, 
covering those Burns employees who performed protection services 
at the Lockheed plant, was the same as that certified under Wacken-
hut, and that the Court had declined to review the propriety of this 
finding.80 Second, the Court pointed out that the union had been 
certified only several months earlier as the bargaining representative 
for Wackenhut's employees, and that a majority of the employees 
hired by Burns had been employed by Wackenhut.81 Under these 
circumstances, the Court found it "not unreasonable for the Board 
to conclude that the union certified to represent all employees in 
the unit still represented a majority of the employees, and that 
Burns could not reasonably have entertained a good-faith doubt 
about that fact."82 Consequently, Burns was required by the express 
22. The Board found that this behavior violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(l) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (1) (1970). 182 N.L.R.B. at 348-50. 
23. This conduct was found to violate sections 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2), (1) (1970). 182 N.L.R.B. at 348-49. 
24. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350. 
25. 182 N.L.R.B. at 349. 
26. 182 N.L.R.B. at 351. Member Jenkins also argued that Wiley held that the 
arbitration clause of the predecessor's contract only survived for the purpose of deter-
mining the successor's obligation concerning certain "vested" rights. 182 N.L.R.B. at 
351. This latter argument, however, appears to be erroneous, for the Court's reasoning 
in Wiley did not rely on the nature of the contract rights involved. Furthermore, it 
is not clear what rights are "vested." In one sense all contract rights are vested, as 
Judge Brown pointed out in rejecting an argument similar to that made by Jenkins. 
United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38, 44 (5th Cir. 1967). 
27. William J. Burns Intl. Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (1971). 
28. 406 U.S. at 291. The finding of a violation in aiding the AFG was not challenged 
by Burns. 406 U.S. at 276. 
29. 406 U.S. at 280-81. 
30. 406 U.S. at 277-78. 
31. 406 U.S. at 278. 
32. 406 U.S. at 278. 
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mandates of sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a)83 of the NLRA to bargain with 
the predecessor's union. 
One commentator has suggested that the Court's reasoning nar-
rows the test for successorship in duty-to-bargain cases by focusing 
on whether a majority of the employees of the successor employer 
had been previously employed by the predecessor employer.34 Al-
though the Court did not say that the hiring of a majority of the 
successor's employees from the predecessor's work force is the only 
test, it appears to have found it essential in holding Burns to a duty 
to bargain.sis This test, however, does not depart from the Board's 
prior approach. It is true that some decisions described the test for 
determining what is a "successor" for purposes of imposing a duty to 
bargain as being based on the absence of a substantial change in 
the employing industry.36 Another Board decision listed several 
factors that may evidence successorship--such as substantial con-
tinuity of business operations; use of the same plant; the same or 
substantially the same work force; the same jobs and working con-
ditions; the same supervisors; the same machinery, equipment, and 
methods of production; and the same product or services.37 Yet, in 
cases where a majority of the successor's work force was not composed 
of its predecessor's employees, the Board has almost invariably found 
no duty to bargain.38 Therefore, in practice the majority-hiring test 
was often decisive even prior to Burns. 
If the "recent certification" of the union as bargaining repre-
33. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a} (1970). 
34. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 252. 
35. 406 U.S. at 279, 295. There is some ambiguity as to which "majority" the Court 
found determinative. Its opinion referred several times to the fact that the successor 
had hired a majority of the predecessor's employees. 406 U.S. at 278 • .Board decisions 
appear, on occasion, to have taken this factor into account. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. 
Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 7-8, 80 L.R.R.M. 1615, 1616 (1972); Lincoln Private 
Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, at 13, 76 L.R.R.M. 1727, 1730 (1971). However, the 
Court placed much more emphasis upon the fact that a majority of the successor's 
employees had been previously employed by the predecessor, 406 U.S. at 280-81. 
36. E.g., NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB 
v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1959); Lincoln Private 
Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, at IO, 76 L.R.R.M. 1727, 1729 (1971). 
37. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 6, 80 L.R.R.M. 1615, 
1616 (1972). 
38. Professor Goldberg suggested in The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor 
Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 735, 793-801 (1969), that the most important factor in 
determining the extent of the successor's obligations in a Board proceeding is whether 
a majority of the successor's work force was employed by the predecessor. He found 
only two cases imposing a duty to bargain when there was no such majority, and a 
court of appeals denied enforcement in the later case. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 
141 NL.R.B. 1065 (1963), enforcement denied, 338 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1964); Firchau 
Logging Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960). The author of this Note has found no other 
cases in which the Board found a successorship when this factor was not present. If 
a majority of the new employer's work force was employed by the predecessor, Goldberg 
suggested that the Board will almost certainly find it to be a successor absent a signifi-
cant change in the method of doing business. There is judicial authority for this 
position. E.g., Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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sentative, a factor mentioned several times by the Court,30 were 
necessary in order to impose a duty to bargain on a successor, Burns 
might narrow prior standards. But certification at all, much less a 
recent certification, should not be viewed as essential. When a 
majority of the new employer's work force has been retained from 
the predecessor, a presumption is arguably raised that the incumbent 
union represents a majority of the new work force.40 While a recent 
certification supports this presumption, other evidence may be suffi-
cient. Thus, at least one court after Burns has upheld the Board's 
imposition upon a successor of a duty to bargain with a predecessor's 
union that had never been certified.41 
Having determined that Bums had a duty to bargain with the 
incumbent union, the Court proceeded to hold that the Board 
could not require Bums to honor the substantive terms of its prede-
cessor's collective-bargaining agreement. Like the court of appeals,42 
the Supreme Court based its decision on section 8(d) of the NLRA, 
which declares that the existence of a duty to bargain "does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession."43 Under the Court's interpretation, this section makes 
free collective bargaining an "express statutory mandate" that limits 
the remedial powers of the Board.44 While some ambiguity may 
remain,45 the tone of the opinion suggests that the limitation is 
absolute. But the provision need not have been so interpreted. The 
Court could have followed the Board's lead46 and used the Wiley 
fiction that a successor is treated as a party to the agreement nego-
tiated by its predecessor even though it did not agree to the contract 
in a common-law sense.47 Moreover, there is no theoretical reason 
why section 8(d) need be read as absolute. The interest in free 
collective bargaining found in section 8(d) could have been balanced 
39. 406 U.S. at 278-81. 
40. See note 82 infra. 
41. To be sure, dicta in Burns indicates that a good faith doubt could not have 
been claimed in the face of a recent Board certification. But that is not to say that 
Burns also supports the obverse. Lack of certification does not by itself sustain a 
finding of a good faith doubt. See 406 U.S. at 279, n.3 •••• When, as here, there 
is at the least a prima fade showing that the union represented a majority of 
the employees within a year of the change in ownership, it must be presumed 
that the union's status continued beyond the changeover. 
NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1972). 
42. 441 F.2d at 915-16. 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
The Court's interpretation of section 8(d) was based on its earlier decision in H.K. 
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), which held that the policy of freedom of 
contract expressed in section 8(d) limits the remedial powers of the Board. 406 U.S. 
at 283-84. 
44. 406 U.S. at 281-84. 
45. See text accompanying notes 58-65 infra. 
46. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350. 
47. 376 U.S. at 550. 
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against the interests of employee security and industrial stability, as 
it was in Wiley.4s 
However, from a policy standpoint, the Court's interpretation 
of section S(d) is understandable in the context of its discussion of 
Wiley. In distinguishing Wiley, the Court placed greatest emphasis 
on its procedural setting: "Wiley arose in the context of a [section] 
30 I suit to compel arbitration, not in the context of an unfair labor 
practice proceeding where the Board is expressly limited by the 
provisions of [section] S(d)."49 At first glance, this seems to make the 
union's remedy depend on a mere choice of forum, but it actually 
reflects a distinction based on the ability of each forum to deal with 
the problem. The Burns Court emphasized that Wiley was founded 
on the national preference for arbitration of labor disputes. 6° It is 
submitted that there are strong policy reasons for preferring arbitra-
tion as a means of deciding if contract obligations are to be imposed 
on a successor, for an arbitrator has the advantages of flexibility and 
expertise in contract interpretation, which are not possessed by the 
Board. Wiley does not permit a union to enforce the contract as a 
whole in an initial action under section 301; were that the case, the 
remedy would depend on a choice of forums. Instead, it merely 
allows the union to compel arbitration, leaving the arbitrator to 
decide what specific obligations survive. 61 
The Court distinguished Wiley in two other respects, both of 
which focus on the relationship between the old and the new 
employer rather than on the procedural context of the litigation. 
First, it noted that Wiley's "narrower holding dealt with a merger 
occurring against a background of state law that embodied the 
general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is 
liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation."62 If this 
distinction were persuasive, Burns would virtually limit Wiley to its 
precise facts. However, such an anal_ysis would ignore the plain 
meaning of Wiley: On the authority 'of Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills,153 the Wiley Court had no difficulty in concluding 
that federal law controlled;64 and the rationale of Wiley clearly 
extended beyond mergers to other changes in corporate structure 
48. !176 U.S. at 549-51. 
49. 406 U.S. at 285. 
50. 406 U.S. at 285-86. 
51. !176 U.S. at 555. 
52. 406 U.S. at 286. 
53. !15!1 U.S. 448 (1957). 
54. !176 U.S. at 548. 
To hold that state law controls in a section !101 action might raise substantial 
constitutional questions if the parties are of nondiverse citizenship. See Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills, !15!1 U.S. 448, 460-546 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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or ownership,115 an interpretation that lower courts have followed 
without exception.56 Thus, it is unlikely that the Burns Court in-
tended to suggest that Wiley be limited to its facts.57 
Second, the Court pointed out that, while Wiley involved a 
merger, "(h]ere there was no merger, sale of assets, and there were 
no dealings whatsoever between Wackenhut and Bums. On the con-
trary, they were competitors for the same work."58 This distinction 
is substantial, for on this very point four Justices dissented from the 
Court's holding that imposed a duty to bargain on Bums.119 Conse-
quently, it has been suggested that the question whether the Board 
can impose a duty to honor the contract where there is some transfer 
of assets between the two employers may still be open.6° First, the 
Court ,'studiously avoided" the use of the term "successor,"61 which 
might suggest that it would be willing to impose a duty to honor in 
cases involving traditional successor employers. Second, the Court 
noted that Bums' mere hiring of employees was "a wholly insuffi-
cient basis for implying ... that Bums ... must be held to have 
agreed to honor" the contract.6~ This may leave open the possibility 
that had there been some more direct nexus between the old and 
the new employers, a sufficient basis might have been found. These 
indications, however, are not compelling on a reading of the opinion 
as a whole. The Court's discussion of the prohibition found in 
section 8(d) suggests a restriction that encompasses all Board pro-
ceedings, not merely those in which there have been no dealings 
between the employers. In addition, the policy of settling labor 
disputes through arbitration, which overrode the concern for free-
dom of contract in Wiley,63 is not a factor in any Board proceeding. 
Finally, Burns may reveal a shift in the Court's evaluation of com-
peting national labor relations policies, with increased weight 
given to freedom of contract.64 Therefore, the most natural reading 
of the Court's opinion, and one that has been adopted by the 
NLRB,65 is that, while the Board can impose a duty to bargain on 
55. The Wiley Court, describing its ruling, said, "[I']his is so as much in cases like 
the present, where the contracting employer disappears into another by merger, as 
in those in which one owner replaces another but the business entity remains the 
same." 376 U.S. at 549. 
56. See cases cited in notes 12-14 supra. 
57. For a discussion of the consistency of Burns and Wiley, see text accompanying 
notes 89-127 infra. 
58. 406 U.S. at 286. 
59. See text accompanying notes 87-88 infra. 
60. St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 276; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, 
at 258. 
61. 406 U.S. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting). 
62. 406 U.S. at 287, 
63. 376 U.S. at 549-!>1. 
64. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra. 
65. E.g., Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.LR.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972). 
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certain new employers, it can never impose a duty to honor sub-
stantive contract terms. 
If Burns is read this broadly, one qualification must be con-
sidered. It is arguable that such an interpretation of Burns fosters 
undesirable inconsistencies in the imposition of labor obligations. 
One observer of the labor scene, in commenting on Burns, has ex-
pressed the view that "in most of these successorship cases, bargain-
ing rights and contract rights should stand together or fall to-
gether,''66 noting: 
The same considerations of employee free choice, industrial stability, 
flexibility of business arrangements, and so on, that militate for or 
against the survival of bargaining rights also militate for or against 
the survival of contract rights.67 
Certainly, the problem of inconsistency would most likely arise in 
Burns-type competitive-bidding situations, the context in which this 
suggestion was made, where there is a duty to bargain and may 
be no duty to arbitrate in a section 301 proceeding.68 However, to 
the extent that contract rights are enforceable through section 30 I 
actions for arbitration, no inconsistency need exist. 69 While Burns 
does preclude the imposition of a duty to honor substantive terms 
in Board proceedings, the more appropriate forum of arbitration is 
still available to determine if contract rights should be imposed. 
Having decided the issues of duty to bargain and duty to honor, 
the Court went on to hold, unanimously, that the Board's order 
requiring Bums to compensate its employees for losses caused by 
Bums' failure to honor the contract could not be sustained on the 
ground that Bums had unilaterally changed existing terms and con-
ditions of employment when it specified the initial terms on which 
it would hire the former Wackenhut employees.70 The Court stated: 
It is difficult to understand how Burns could be said to have 
changed unilaterally any pre-existing term or condition of employ-
ment . . . when it had no previous relationship whatsoever to the 
66. St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 276. 
67. Id. 
68. For a discussion of the duty to arbitrate in these situations, see text accompany-
ing notes 140-47 infra. 
69. This discussion, of course, assumes that the collective-bargaining agreements in 
question contain arbitration clauses. This assumption is not unrealistic; one survey 
has found that 94 per cent of all collective-bargaining agreements have some form of 
arbitration clause. BNA, BASIC PATI'ERNS IN UNION CONTRAC'fS 1[ 51:6 (7th ed. 1971). 
The obligations of a successor employer in a section 301 action when there is no 
arbitration clause remain unclear. 
70. 406 U.S. at 292-96. In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Court upheld an 
order of the NLRB that found that section 8(a)(5) was violated when an employer 
instituted changes in the terms and conditions of employment without first consulting 
the union with which it was negotiating. 
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bargaining unit and ... no outstanding terms and conditions from 
which a change could be inferred.71 
Only when "it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to 
retain all of the employees in the unit" must it bargain with the 
incumbent union over initial terms.72 In other cases it may set its 
own terms until its obligation to bargain matures on the hiring of 
its entire work force, a majority of whom were its predecessor's 
employees.73 
It has been suggested74 that this analysis overrules Overnite 
Transportation Co.,75 in which the Board held that the successor 
had a duty to bargain with the union from the day it took over the 
predecessor's business. If the Burns holding on this point is limited 
to situations where there have been no dealings between the two 
employers, it may not encroach upon Overnite in traditional suc-
cessorship cases.76 Such a limitation, however, is unlikely because 
the Court stated explicitly that "a successor employer is ordinarily 
free to set initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a 
predecessor,"77 and the new employer will be required to bargain 
with the union before setting initial terms when "it is perfectly 
clear" that all the old employees will be retained. In any event, the 
Court did not expressly overrule Overnite, which was cited twice in 
support of Justice White's argument.78 Perhaps the Court felt that 
Overnite fell within the "perfectly clear" exception since Ovemite 
had retained all of its predecessor's employees.79 Moreover, the 
Court made it clear that when the duty to bargain matures the 
requirements of Overnite would come into effect.80 To the extent 
that the Court's analysis is inconsistent with Overnite, it affects only 
the timing of the duty to bargain and not the scope of that duty. 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Brennan and Powell, concurred in the Court's decision insofar as it 
held that Bums had no duty to honor the substantive terms of 
71. 406 U.S. at 294 (emphasis original). 
72. 406 U.S. at 294-95. 
73. 406 U.S. at 295. 
One may question why the Court makes an exception only when it is perfectly clear 
that all of the predecessor's employees are to be retained. Since the Court would impose 
a duty to bargain when a new employer bas hired a majority of its work force from 
its predecessor's, a more consistent approach would bar unilateral changes when it is 
"perfectly clear" that that majority is to be retained. 
74. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 258. 
75. 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 838 (1967). 
76. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 259. 
77. 406 U.S. at 294. 
78. 406 U.S. at 293, 294. 
79. 372 F .2d at 768. 
80. 406 U.S. at 294. 
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Wackenhut's collective-bargaining agreement, but dissented from the 
Court's imposing a duty to bargain on Bums.81 Justice Rehnquist 
initially expressed disagreement with two facets of the Court's 
analysis. First, he pointed out that it was not "mathematically 
demonstrable" that the incumbent union was the choice of a 
majority of Burns' work force. Even though twenty-seven of Bums' 
forty-two employees had been previously employed by Wackenhut, 
there was no indication that they had all supported the union in the 
election at Wackenhut.82 Second, he criticized the Court's reliance 
on the Board's determination that the previous unit was still ap-
propriate. 83 Both of these determinations, Justice Rehnquist argued, 
themselves depended on the assumption that Bums was a successor.84 
Therefore, the issue, as framed by Justice Rehnquist, became 
whether Bums was a successor. 
Apparently finding Wiley controlling even though it did not 
arise in a Board proceeding, 85 the dissent insisted that the policy 
of employee security on which Wiley was based should be limited 
to some degree by other interests, such as freedom of contract and 
the employer's need to remain competitive.86 Justice Rehnquist 
argued that these limits would be passed were Bums found to be a 
successor in the absence of the transfer of a single asset from Wacken-
hut to Bums.87 He would require that there be continuity "at 
least in part on the employer's side of the equation, rather than only 
on that of the employees" before an employer is held to be a 
successor for Board or section 301 purposes.88 
Thus, Justice Rehnquist's opinion has direct implications for 
section 30 I actions, as well as Board proceedings. First, however, it 
81. 406 U.S. at 296. 
82. 406 U.S. at 297. This analysis is correct if there were more than five antiunion 
votes in the election at Wackenhut. However, the NLRA does not require a union 
to rcdemonstrate continually its majority status. In fact, there are certain established 
rules, ~uch as the contract bar and certification bar, that for policy reasons ensure the 
union's status although it has in fact lost its majority status. E.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 
348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954) (certification bar); Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 
1384, 1387 (1963) (contract bar). Similarly, in imposing obligations on successors the 
presumption of continued majority status is defensible as a matter of policy because 
it eliminates time-consuming determinations, promotes industrial stability, and, in most 
cases, does in fact accord with the wishes of the employees. See Goldberg, supra note 
38, at 789-92. 
83. 406 U.S. at 297-98. 
s.t. 406 U.S. at 297-99. 
85. Justice Rehnquist did show some awareness of the difference between the 
Board's doctrine and that established under section 301 in Wiley when he referred to 
Wiley as employing "a form of the 'successor' doctrine." 406 U.S. at 299 (emphasis 
added). For a discussion of differences in the two successorship doctrines, see text 
accompanying notes 128-32 infra. 
86. 406 U.S. at 302-04. 
87. 406 U.S. at 304-05. 
88. 406 U.S. at 305. 
582 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:571 
must be determined whether Wiley retains any vitality after Burns.60 
While Burns distinguished Wiley and did not expressly overrule 
it, much of the language in Burns suggests that the Court may be 
re-evaluating the role of the labor contract. Wiley described the 
collective-bargaining agreement as a "'generalized code'" that was 
"not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relation-
ship."80 In contrast, both the majority91 and the dissent92 in Burns 
stressed notions of consent that are derived from common-law 
contract theory. Moreover, Justice White suggested that the policies 
of employee job security and industrial stability that Wiley found 
"could be overcome only if other considerations compellingly so 
demanded"98 must be subordinated to other policies such as free-
dom of collective bargaining.94 
Is there a valid distinction between the two cases that would 
explain this apparent shift in tone? It was suggested above0~ that 
Justice White emphasized the difference between a Board proceed-
ing, subject to section 8(d), and section 301 actions to compel 
arbitration; but section 8(d) in itself is not a sufficient reason for 
treating the two forums differently.96 The issue, therefore, must 
be viewed on a policy level: Assuming that Burns precludes the 
imposition of contract rights in all Board actions, does it make sense 
to say that such rights may still be imposed through arbitration? 
If not, Burns may be the first in a line of narrowing decisions that 
eventually would limit Wiley to its facts or even expressly overrule 
the 1964 case.97 The thesis of the following discussion is that there 
are legitimate policy reasons for leaving the imposition of substan-
tive contract terms to the arbitrator. 
First, the arbitrator has "special skill and experience" in contract 
interpretation, as was recently acknowledged in Collyer Insulated 
Wire,96 where the Board stated its policy of deferring to arbitrators 
89. It is clear that Burns has narrowed the scope given to Wiley by at least one 
commentator, who had urged that the policies emphasized by Justice Harlan required 
the :Board to impose a duty to honor the contract under section 8(a)(5). Goldberg, supra 
note 38, at 809-13. 
90. 376 U.S. at 550, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
91. 406 U.S. at 287. 
92. 406 U.S. at 303. 
93. 376 U.S. at 549-50. 
94. 406 U.S. at 287. 
95, See tex.t accompanying notes 42-51 supra. 
96. See tex.t accompanying notes 42-48 supra. 
97. The Court's use of subsequent, inconsistent cases as a rationale for overruling 
a decision is described in Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 
SUP. CT. R.Ev. 211, 223-26. 
98. 192 N.L.R.:B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971). 
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in such matters.99 Second, the arbitrator, whose role is created by a 
given contract, has greater flexibility than the Board. He need not 
formulate general rules but can focus on the contract that is before 
him.100 Nor is he required to follow precedent, other than that 
established in the industry in question.101 Thus, the arbitrator may 
examine fact situations in detail, evaluate considerations of fairness, 
and devise flexible remedies102 when determining what obligations 
are to be imposed under a contract. 
There may be some question concerning the degree of flexibility 
that the arbitrator has in modifying obligations under the contract 
to reflect the unusual problems that might arise under a successor 
employer,103 and the tone of the Supreme Court's decision in Burns 
could itself have an inhibiting effect on arbitrators.104 However, it 
is settled that the arbitrator's function is to resolve problems that 
are not adequately provided for in the contract.105 A successorship 
situation, almost by definition, will not be adequately covered by 
the contract, for, even when a transfer is anticipated, it is difficult 
to predict what changes will occur. The ability of the arbitrator to 
react flexibly in these circumstances was expressly approved by the 
Court in Wiley106 and elaborated in later cases applying that deci-
sion.107 As long as the arbitrator does not impose new obligations 
99. But cf. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 351 (1969) (Board can order employer to sign 
contract and pay benefits under contract when employer wrongfully refuses to sign 
the negotiated agreement). 
100. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
101. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 
(1960). 
102. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
103. Compare United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 
(3d Cir. 1964), with Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 
958 (9th Cir. 1964). 
104. For an example of the inhibiting effects of H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 
99 (1970), and the Second Circuit's decision in Burns, see Hubacber Cadillac, Inc., 57 
Lab. Arb. 227 (1971) (Updegraff, Arbitrator). Another arbitrator, however, has made 
it quite clear that he does not feel bound by Burns in handling claims made in a 
successorship case. New England Lead Burning Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. 1254, 1258 (1972) 
(Kiefe, Arbitrator). 
105. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81 
(1960). 
106. Discussing the potential infringement on the interests of the successor's non-
unionized employees, the Court said, "[W]e have little doubt that within the flexible 
procedures of arbitration a solution can be reached which would avoid disturbing 
labor relations in the Wiley plant." 376 U.S. at 552 n.5. 
107. Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6, 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 381 (1967); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d 
Cir. 1964). 
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not founded on the predecessor's contract,1°8 or apply statutory law 
or common law, rather than the terms of the contract,109 he should 
be given a broad latitude in interpretation. 
The Board, on the other hand, is constricted by the need to 
formulate general rules and follow precedent. The complex factual 
situations that arise in the successorship area pose special difficulties 
for the Board because procedural and time limitations prevent it 
from closely evaluating every clause at issue between a successor and 
a union. Perhaps for this reason, the Board in Burns took an all-or-
nothing approach: ordinarily, the entire contract would be binding 
on the successor, while in "unusual circumstances," left undefined, 
the successor would not be held to any contract obligations.110 
Several of the Board's subsequent decisions suggest that such an 
approach is inadequate when it would be equitable to impose part 
but not all of a contract. 
In Emerald Maintenance, Inc.,111 one of the first cases in which 
the Board found "unusual circumstances,''112 the new employer was 
awarded a government contract to provide maintenance and housing 
services, previously provided by two other contractors, on a United 
States Air Force base. The Board held that Emerald, although it 
was a successor employer with a duty to bargain, was not bound to 
honor its predecessors' collective-bargaining agreements.113 First, the 
Board felt that an exception was necessary because the United States 
Comptroller General had refused to consider the agreed-upon in-
crease in wages when specifying the prevailing rates to bidders for 
the government service contract.114 However, it is questionable 
whether the actions of federal "agencies primarily charged with 
108. Wiley states that the union cannot use arbitration to gain new rights against 
the successor employer. 376 U.S. at 554-55. 
109. [A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective 
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial 
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is 
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 8c Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
110. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350. 
111. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971), enforced in part, 464 F.2d 698 
(5th Cir. 1972). The Fifth Circuit upheld the Board's finding that Emerald need not 
honor the previously negotiated contract on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Bums. Also on the basis of that decision, the court refused to enforce the Board's 
order of restitution of economic benefits withheld or denied. The court said that it was 
not "perfectly clear'' that the employer planned to retain all of the predecessor's 
employees when it made unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employ• 
ment. 464 F.2d at 701. But the court did enforce the Board's order requiring Emerald 
to bargain with the union. 464 F.2d at 701-03. 
112. For another instance of "unusual circumstances," see G.T. &: E. Data Servs. 
Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 79 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1971). 
113. 188 N.LR.B. No. 139, at 6-8, 76 L.R.R.l\I. at 1438-39. 
114. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 6-8, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438-39. 
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administration of the Federal Service Contract Act"115 should be 
permitted to disturb national labor relations policy. In addition, the 
bidders had been notified by the union before submitting their 
bids,116 so the increases could have been included in their calcula-
tions. Second, the Board suggested that its decision in Burns had 
assumed that the successor was able to adjust the terms of the con-
tract during negotiations to accommodate the demands of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement,117 while Emerald, the Board said, "sug-
gests the hazards" of applying that remedy in annual-bidding 
situations.118 These hazards, however, were present in Burns, which 
itself involved annual bidding. In fact, the Board in that case felt 
that this factor increased the need for stability, which would be 
served by the survival of the collective-bargaining agreement.119 
Neither the nature of the government contract nor the problems 
inherent in the annual-bidding situation seem to justify a general 
exception to Burns. Rather, the Board seems to have taken an ad hoc 
approach. Its reluctance to follow Burns may have been due to the 
unfairness of imposing a wage increase on an employer that had 
relied on the federal bureaucracy in failing to include the increase 
in its bid.120 While it may be unjust to enforce the entire contract in 
such circumstances, there is no need to disregard it completely. An 
arbitrator could adapt the remedy to the particular situation. 
Conversely, on at least one occasion, the Board failed to find 
"unusual circumstances" when it might have been appropriate to 
do so. In Interstate 65 Corp.,121 the Board imposed the entire con-
tract on a successor that argued that it had acquired the business 
under economic duress through an informal foreclosure. The deci-
sion of the trial examiner, accepted in this respect by the Board, 122 
said that the employer's argument went to the form of the transfer, 
which was not controlling in determining whether there was a 
successor.123 However, economic duress raises instead the question 
whether it is fair to impose obligations on an employer even if it is 
a successor. The Board may have been reluctant to approach the 
problem in these terms because it was trying to develop a uniform 
general approach, while an arbitrator would have had no such 
restraints. 
115. 188 N.LR.B. No. 139, at 8, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1439. 
116. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438. 
117. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 6, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438. 
ll8. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 8, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1439. 
119. 182 N.LR.B. at 350. 
120. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438. 
121. 186 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 75 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1970), enforced in part, 453 F.2d 269 
(6th Cir. 1971). 
122. 186 N.LR.B. No. 41, at 3, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1405. 
123. 186 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 12-13, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1405. 
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The flexibility of arbitration, as the Court pointed out in the 
Steelworkers Trilog;y,124 can serve the ends of employee security and 
industrial stability without sacrificing the interests of the employer. 
The best approach would read Wiley and Burns together as affirm-
ing the arbitrator's special expertise in determining the contractual 
obligations of successors.125 
One problem with this approach remains to be considered. Sub-
ject to a limited exception, the Burns Court would not find a sec-
tion 8(a)(5) violation when a new employer has unilaterally set the 
initial terms under which it hired a predecessor's employees.126 It 
can be argued that allowing arbitration and enforcement of different 
terms of employment set out in its predecessor's collective-bargaining 
agreement would be inconsistent with Burns and thus would violate 
the policy favoring consistent interpretation of a statutory scheme.127 
However, the Court in Burns established no affirmative right to set 
initial terms, but merely held that to do so did not constitute an 
unfair labor practice. More importantly, even if there is some 
theoretical conflict, the policy against inconsistency should be out-
weighed by the stronger policies favoring arbitration as a means 
of fostering industrial stability. 
While Burns need not undermine Wiley, it may affect what will 
be deemed to be a successor employer for section 30 I purposes. 
Under Wiley a new employer can be compelled to arbitrate the 
extent of his obligation under a predecessor's collective-bargaining 
agreement when there is "substantial continuity of identity" in the 
employing industry.128 In contrast to its role in the majority-hiring 
test for imposing a duty to bargain,129 the number of the predeces-
sor's employees hired by the new employer is not determinative in 
124. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
125. As will be recalled, Member Jenkins argued in his dissent in Burns that Wiley 
did not apply to Board proceedings because the Court had emphasized the flexibility 
of arbitration. See text accompanying note 26 supra. 
126. See text accompanying notes 70-80 supra. 
127. Cf. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), in which the Court inter• 
preted the exemption from the antitrust laws for certain union activities contained in 
section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), in light of the ban on enjoining 
labor disputes contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970). 
Saying that legislation must not be interpreted in a "spirit of mutilating narrowness," 
the Court held that it would be "strange indeed" to allow a criminal indictment under 
the antitrust laws when the activities involved could not be enjoined. 312 U.S. at 235. 
However, the Court did not base its holding only on the possible inconsistency, but 
also on the belief that "[t]he underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to 
restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton 
Act but which was frustrated ••• by unduly restrictive judicial construction." 312 U.S. 
at 235-36. 
128. 376 U.S. at 551. 
129. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra. 
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section 301 actions, although it may be considered.13° For example, 
in Wiley itself a duty to arbitrate was imposed upon the successor 
despite the fact that the predecessor's employees formed only a small 
part of the successor's work force;131 the new employer's hiring of a 
majority of its predecessor's employees was merely evidence of 
"similarity and continuity of operation."132 The substantial-con-
tinuity test serves the interests of employee job security and indus-
trial stability by meeting the expectations of the employees.133 Nor 
did Wiley ignore the employer's interests. Its acknowledgement that 
the new employer, unlike the employees, can negotiate over the 
terms of the transfer134 may suggest that the Court believed that 
the employer's interests were adequately protected. After Burns 
the substantial-continuity test remains applicable in section 301 
130. It should be noted that the Wiley test, unlike the .Board majority-hiring test, 
may be satisfied even if the new employer does not hire any of its predecessor's em-
ployees. The courts have left the decision to the arbitrator when the union disputes a 
new employer's failure to hire the former employer's employees. Monroe Sander Corp. 
v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967): Detroit Local Joint 
Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2329 (E.D. Mich., 
Aug. 22, 1972). However, an arbitrator's order to rehire might not be enforced by a 
court, especially if enforcement would require the large-scale displacement of the 
successor's employees. Fearing that such an order, or apprehension concerning the 
possibility of such an order, might cause employee unrest, Chief Judge Lumbard 
dissented from the arbitration order in Monroe Sander. He would have held that the 
union's demand that some of the successor's employees be discharged to make room 
for the predecessor's employees was "'so plainly unreasonable' " as to be " 'nonarbi-
trable.'" 377 F.2d at 14, quoting John Wiley 8: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 
555 (1964). 
Of course, discrimination in hiring against union members employed by its prede• 
cessor may subject a successor employer to an unfair labor practice charge under 
section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), for "discrimination in regard to hire or 
tenure of employment" in order to discourage union membership. 
131. 376 U.S. at 551. A minority union can bring a section 301 action to enforce 
labor contracts. Retail Clerks, Locals 128 &: 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 
(1962). 
132. 376 U.S. at 551. 
133. If the union's contract with the predecessor has a successorship clause, stating 
that a new employer will be bound under the contract, there is more objective evidence 
of the expectations of the employees. However, such a clause is not essential to holding 
a new employer to his predecessor's labor obligations. Neither Wiley nor Bums in-
volved contracts containing successorship clauses, and in neither case was their absence 
considered relevant to the question of what the new employer's obligations should be. 
Furthermore, no case has been found in which the court considered the presence of a 
successorship clause to be determinative or even evidentiary of whether a new em-
ployer was a successor, with the possible exception of Detroit Local Joint Exec. :Bd., 
Hotel Employees v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2329, 2333 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 22, 
1972). It is true that these clauses give no indication of the successor's intent; but they 
are evidence of the union's intent, and they give the new employer notice of possible 
obligations. Arbitrators, unlike courts, have recognized their evidentiary importance. 
See Wamco, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. 1220 (1971) (Roper, Arbitrator) (no successorship clause); 
Printing Indus., Inc., 56 Lab. Arb. 296 (1971) Gackson, Arbitrator) (successorship 
clause present); Sanborn's Motor Express, 44 Lab. Arb. 346 (1965) (Wallen, Arbitrator) 
(successorship clause present). 
134. 376 U.S. at 549. 
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actions, for there is little possibility that the Court intended to limit 
Wiley to its facts.135 But it is another matter to determine in what 
particular fact situations such continuity may be found. 
The dissent of Justice Rehnquist is a reliable indication that 
at least four Justices will limit Wiley to situations in which there 
is some transfer of assets, tangible or intangible, between the old 
and the new employing entities.136 This requirement should not 
mean that there must be direct transactions between the employer 
with which arbitration is sought and the employer that negotiated 
the contract. Where, for example, the business passes through a 
third party that is an intermediary, the situation may be viewed 
conceptually as a chain of successors, each of which acquires labor 
obligations for the period, however short, in which it holds the 
business. This might be the situation when, for example, a franchisee 
sells to a franchisor that in tum sells to a new franchisee. It should 
also be noted that the dissent considered the transfer of intangible 
assets also to be evidence of continuity on the employer's side. Thus, 
Justice Rehnquist's requirements might be met even in a service 
industry context, if the new employer acquires "goodwill," contract 
rights, or a franchise license from a predecessor. 
The most troubling question is raised in a competitive-bidding 
situation such as Burns. In such a case, there is no transfer of assets, 
since the service contract is not passed from one employer to the 
other, but is created anew with each employer; therefore, Justice 
Rehnquist's conditions would not be met. But the majority opinion 
in Burns appears to have left open the question whether arbitration 
could be enforced in section 301 actions in this situation. 
It may be contended that the policies of industrial stability and 
employee job security in some cases require that an employer be 
found to be a successor even where there are no dealings between 
the employers.137 On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist, concerned 
with fairness to the employer, suggests that the "legitimate expecta-
tions of the employees" require at most that the employer be bound 
only when there is some transfer of assets.138 This test, however, is 
unnecessarily limited. A more complete test for continuity would 
examine the similarity of the operations as a whole139-the business 
functions, the jobs performed by the employees, and the method of 
supervision, as well as any transfer of assets. Even in a competitive-
bidding case, these other factors evidence both the expectations 
135. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra. 
136. 406 U.S. at 305. 
137. See Goldberg, supra note 38, at 749-50. 
138. 406 U.S. at 305. 
139. Wiley itself focused on the "relative similarity and continuity of operation," 
not on any transfer of assets. 376 U.S. at 551. 
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of the employees and the ease with which the new employer can 
assume the labor obligations of the old employer. It is true that at 
first glance the terms "competitor" and "successor" seem to be 
directly opposed. However, such labels, while they provide some 
guidance, may oversimplify a complex problem. In essence, "suc-
cessor" is a conclusory term, which may mean nothing more than a 
new employer upon which an old employer's labor obligations are 
imposed. Specifically, the question should be whether it is fair to 
both employer and employees, and desirable in terms of national 
labor relations policies, to impose a duty to arbitrate in a given 
competitive-bidding case. 
If the question is viewed in this light, several impediments to 
applying Wiley in a competitive-bidding case must be considered. 
First, as Justice Rehnquist suggests,140 the imposition of continuing 
labor obligations may disrupt the competitive status of all the 
bidders, as well as that of the industry to which the bids are sub-
mitted.141 Yet, Wiley indicated that the employer's interest in 
competition must be limited when it infringes on the security of 
the employees and threatens industrial stability.142 Stability and 
security require special protection in an annual-bidding situation.143 
Moreover, while holding a winning bidder to a duty to arbitrate 
may in some cases disturb competition by "import[ing] unwarranted 
rigidity into labor-management relations,"144 failing to apply Wiley 
is even more likely to put the employer that has the existing con-
tract at a competitive disadvantage. It will be held to the terms of 
the negotiated collective-bargaining agreement if it is awarded the 
next contract, while all other bidders would be exempt from any 
such obligation. 
Reluctance to find that a competitive bidder is a successor may 
also stem from the fear that the bidder may have had no notice of 
its possible obligations to the union. Absent notice, it may well be 
unfair to impose labor obligations on an employer that had no 
chance to make appropriate adjustments in its bid.145 But if the new 
140. 406 U.S. at 307-08. 
141. Justice Rehnquist, of course, would not impose a duty to bargain on a new 
employer in an annual-bidding situation. This approach could discourage employee 
organization in the service industries. Unions would be at a disadvantage if they were 
forced to reorganize employees and reprove their majority status each time a new em-
ployer won the contract. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 252 n.35. 
142. 376 U.S. at 549. 
143. It might be contended that the duty to bargain imposed by the Court in Burns 
gives sufficient protection to employee expectations and industrial stability. But im-
posing only a duty to bargain would mean that agreements would have to be negoti-
ated each time the employer changed, possibly every year. This would subject 
employees and the recipients of their services to the possibilities of annual strikes and 
might deny them the benefits of longer-term contracts. 
144. 406 U.S. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting). 
145. The Court in Wiley said, "[WJe do not rule out the possibility that a union 
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employer has had notice from the union of the employees' expecta-
tions, it is less inequitable to require it to arbitrate under its 
predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement, for it could have con-
sulted that document to determine the extent of the obligation.146 
Therefore, while a collective-bargaining agreement might logically 
be imposed through arbitration against a "successor" even in a 
competitive-bidding situation when there is substantial evidence of 
continuity in the operations considered as a whole, the imposition 
of such obligations should be conditioned on the union's informing 
all bidders of the negotiated contract. Giving the successor notice 
poses no special difficulties. In industries with regular bidding there 
would be little danger that the union would be unaware of the 
existence of prospective new employers and thus fail to notify them. 
It should be noted that even if a bidder has notice, it will not 
be able to predict the extent to which the arbitrator will hold it to 
the predecessor's contract and thus may not be able to determine its 
labor costs precisely. However, bidding necessarily involves risks and 
estimates. Holding the winning bidder to arbitrate with the union 
under section 30 I would not increase its risks, but would rather 
define one of the variables more precisely. Since the arbitrator could 
give the union only rights included in the contract,147 the bidder 
would know the upper limit on its labor costs for the term of the 
contract. 
In conclusion, Burns need not be read as a drastic curtailment 
of the Court's earlier decision in Wiley. While considerable question 
may exist in regard to competitive-bidding situations, section 30 I 
actions to compel arbitration should remain available, at least in 
the ordinary successorship case. Read together, Burns and Wiley 
can ensure that the imposition of contract obligations on successor 
employers will be handled with a desirable measure of flexibility. 
might abandon its right to arbitration by failing to make its claims known." 376 U.S. 
at 551. 
146. See, e.g., Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Axb. 844 (1963) (Crawford, Arbitrator). 
147. John Wiley &: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964). 
